The Sahel as the Epicenter of Global Terrorism: Economic Collapse, Governance Failure, and the Escalating Risk of CBRNE Proliferation

Introduction

The Sahel region has become the global epicenter of terrorism, accounting for over half of worldwide terrorism-related deaths in 2024. This article argues that sustained economic fragility, governance collapse, climate stress, and international counterterrorism disengagement have created permissive environments for violent extremist organizations to consolidate territorial control and expand operational sophistication. Beyond insurgency, the region’s instability increases the risk of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive (CBRNE) proliferation. The convergence of jihadist movements, criminal enterprises, military juntas, and external mercenary actors heightens the probability of asymmetric escalation. This paper raises a strategic alarm: without continuous international engagement and structural economic stabilization, the Sahel risks transforming from a regional conflict zone into a global incubator for future-generation unconventional threats.

The Sahel, stretching from Senegal to Eritrea between the Sahara Desert and the African tropics, has evolved into the most lethal theater of terrorism worldwide. According to the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED, 2024), approximately 51% of global terrorism-related deaths in 2024 occurred in this region. This concentration of violence signals more than localized insurgency; it reflects systemic state fragility and a strategic transition in the geography of global extremism.

Violent extremist organizations, including Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have expanded their territorial reach and operational tempo amid eroding governance and declining international counterterrorism presence. Simultaneously, external actors, such as the Wagner Group, have entered the theater, complicating the security environment and eroding traditional multilateral stabilisation mechanisms.

This article contends that the Sahel’s instability does not represent only a counterinsurgency challenge but also an emerging risk of CBRNE proliferation. Economic collapse, governance deficits, and the convergence of hybrid threats collectively lower the barriers to unconventional escalation.

Structural Economic Fragility and Extremist Expansion

Poverty, Youth Bulges, and Governance Deficits

Sahelian states consistently rank among the most fragile globally (Fund for Peace, 2023). High fertility rates have produced rapidly expanding youth populations with limited access to employment, education, and political inclusion. In fragile economies, unemployed youth cohorts become highly susceptible to recruitment incentives offered by extremist organizations (World Bank, 2011).

It is overly simplistic to claim that poverty alone causes terrorism. However, chronic economic marginalization, when combined with state corruption and coercive security practices, creates fertile ground for insurgent mobilization. Extremist groups frequently provide salaries or stipends, food and access to basic services, protection from rival militias, and alternative justice systems. In many rural areas of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, extremist organizations have effectively replaced government administration structures (International Crisis Group, 2022).

Geographic Inequality and Peripheral Neglect

State authority in Sahelian countries is disproportionately concentrated in southern metropolitan centers. Peripheral northern regions, such as Liptako-Gourma, remain underdeveloped and underserved. This territorial imbalance has historically fueled rebellions, including Tuareg uprisings in Mali.

Extremist groups take advantage of these grievances by embedding themselves within disadvantaged communities, exploiting local conflicts over land, water, and ethnic tensions to expand influence.

Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2022) reports that temperatures in the Sahel are rising 1.5 times faster than the global average. This environmental shift possesses direct security implications. Diminishing rainfall and desertification reduce arable land and water access, intensifying clashes among pastoralists, farmers, and fishing communities. Extremist groups strategically insert themselves into these disputes, presenting as protectors or arbitrators.

Climate stress, therefore, functions as a force multiplier. It compounds economic fragility, deepens displacement, and expands recruitment pools. The region has witnessed more than 5 million displaced persons across the Liptako-Gourma and Lake Chad Basin zones (UNHCR, 2023). Prolonged displacement undermines social cohesion and creates unregulated conditions in which radicalization networks can operate with minimal oversight.

Governance Collapse and the Security Vacuum

Coups and Institutional Erosion

Between 2020 and 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger experienced successive coups d’état. These political disruptions weakened regional coordination mechanisms such as the G5 Sahel Force and undermined confidence in democratic leadership.

The withdrawal of French forces under Operation Barkhane and the termination of the UN peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) created a pronounced security vacuum (Charbonneau, 2022). Within months, extremist violence intensified greatly.

Security vacuums are strategic accelerants. Extremist organizations rapidly take advantage of gaps in surveillance, intelligence, and force projection.

External Mercenary Involvement

The Malian junta’s partnership with the Wagner Group further destabilised the region. Allegations of mass civilian casualties and human rights abuses have aggravated mistrust between populations and governing authorities (United Nations Human Rights Office, 2023). When state legitimacy erodes, extremist narratives gain traction. Counterterrorism operations perceived as predatory or indiscriminate drive recruitment for insurgent groups.

Criminal Terror Convergence

The Sahel is a major transit corridor for narcotics, weapons trafficking, and migrant smuggling. According to the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (2021), armed groups increasingly tax or participate in illicit trade networks.

Integration between criminal enterprises and extremist organizations enhances financial endurance and logistical sophistication. Such convergence provides multiple revenue streams to fund higher-impact operations. Historically, terrorist organizations that achieve financial autonomy tend to escalate tactics and pursue more ambitious strategic objectives.

The Escalating Risk of CBRNE Proliferation

While conventional insurgency dominates headlines, the Sahel’s structural instability increases the likelihood of an unconventional threat emerging.

Chemical Threat Potential

Agricultural and mining industries across the Sahel utilize significant quantities of dual-use chemicals, including fertilizers, industrial chlorine, and extraction reagents. Weak regulatory systems and corruption increase diversion risks.

Chemical weaponization by non-state actors does not require advanced industrial capacity. Improvised chemical dissemination methods have been documented in multiple conflict zones (Ackerman & Tamsett, 2009). The combination of poor oversight, expanding extremist safe havens, and criminal smuggling networks creates an alarming chemical risk profile.

Biological Risk Factors

Public health systems across the Sahel are under-resourced and fragmented. Limited biosurveillance infrastructure hinders early detection of outbreaks. Laboratory security procedures are inconsistent, and oversight of pathogen storage is often weak (Koblentz, 2010).

In fragile states, deliberate biological incidents may initially be indistinguishable from endemic disease outbreaks. This vagueness complicates response and attribution. Although no confirmed active biological weapons programs exist among Sahelian extremist groups, structural vulnerabilities reduce barriers to experimentation or opportunistic misuse.

Radiological Risk

Niger is a major global uranium producer. Radiological sources used in mining, medicine, and industrial applications call for robust accountability systems. Radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) require neither advanced enrichment nor complex engineering, only access to radiological material and an effective dispersal mechanism.

In politically unstable environments, source security and inventory control degrade. Criminal-terror networks capable of smuggling arms may similarly traffic radiological material.

State-Enabled Escalation and Proxy Dynamics

The alignment of military juntas with external actors creates additional proliferation concerns. Proxy environments have historically increased the risk of illicit transfers and weakened export controls (Byman, 2018).

While no current evidence demonstrates direct state-enabled CBRNE support to Sahelian extremists, deteriorating oversight structures create permissive conditions. Risk accumulation is incremental. It rarely announces itself before manifesting.

Strategic Consequences for the United States and Europe

The Sahel’s instability carries global ramifications.  Migration flows into Europe, destabilizing political systems. Expanded safe havens for transnational terror plotting. Strengthened illicit trafficking routes connecting Africa, the Middle East, and Europe.

Increased probability of asymmetric experimentation. Ungoverned or poorly governed spaces historically incubate transnational threats. Afghanistan in the 1990s and Syria after 2011 illustrate how localized conflicts evolve into global security crises. If extremist organizations consolidate durable territorial governance in the Sahel, their deliberate ambition will likely expand beyond regional insurgency.

A Strategic Alarm

The convergence of economic collapse, climate stress, governance failure, criminal hybridization, and international disengagement creates conditions conducive to escalation. The threshold for CBRNE experimentation is not static. It lowers progressively as extremist organizations gain territorial control, financial autonomy, and logistical sophistication.

The international community risks repeating a familiar error, treating early warning signs as manageable instability rather than strategic inflection points. Counterterrorism strategy must integrate economic stabilization, climate adaptation assistance, and governance reform support, strengthened export controls, radiological source security programs, and biosurveillance enhancement. Failure to act risks allowing the Sahel to evolve from a regional insurgency zone into a testing ground for unconventional warfare.

Conclusion

The Sahel is no longer a peripheral security concern. It is the global epicenter of violent extremism and an emerging incubator for asymmetric escalation risk. Economic fragility and governance collapse have enabled extremist expansion at an unprecedented scale. Criminal-terror convergence strengthens operational resilience. Climate stress intensifies resource conflict. External mercenary involvement complicates stabilization.

While current violence continues to be predominantly conventional, structural vulnerabilities raise credible concerns about CBRNE proliferation over time. Strategic warning indicators are present. The cost of prevention today will be substantially lower than the cost of response tomorrow.

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